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1 Introduction
To counter the Hamas ‘threat to the occupied
West Bank’ (Palestine), the Palestinian Awqaf
(Islamic Endowments) Minister issued a
statement on 10 September 2010 banning Eid
lullabies after Ramadan, calling the practice
bid’a (an invention). That stand was preceded by
another move led by the Palestinian authority, in
its bid to contain and weaken the Islamist
movement Hamas: enforcing control over the
mosques in order to limit the role of the religion
in daily life, and cancelling the Qur’an reading
before the call for prayer or the use of loud
speakers. This new policy stresses the ‘secularist’
identity of the ‘Palestinian national project’
under President Mahmoud Abbas and his Prime
Minister Salam Fayyad and is supported by all
political factions under the umbrella of the
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). It
replaced Yasser Arafat’s policy that tried to co-
opt the Islamic movement and push his own
image as a Jihad fighter. Arafat’s famous call ‘to
march to Jerusalem with millions of martyrs’ in
2004, is a remnant of this. What brought about
this change in the stance of the Palestinian
leadership from that of Jihadi Muslims to
staunch secularists? Why do some prominent
leaders publicly advocate that ‘faith should not
intervene in politics’ to safeguard the
‘Palestinian national project and building a
Palestinian state’?
This article argues that the Palestinian national
elite have not suddenly discovered a ‘true
secular’ identity triggering this change in their
political outlook. Rather, post-colonial ‘secularist’
nationalist elites in the Arab world started using
religion in this way long before contemporary
Islamic movements came on the scene. The
result of this ‘secularisation’ process in the Arab
world, we are now witnessing, is a decaying
police state in which all sorts of rights (political,
civil and social) are systematically violated.
The important point to make here is that if we
compare the trajectory of secularism – a term
born in the West – with how it developed in Arab
societies, the focus of the analysis is not on its
origins but on the forms of life secularism
articulates, the powers it releases or disables. It
then becomes increasingly clear that Arabic
secularism resulted in crushing the very
structure of the notion of citizenship and the
figure of the secular citizen subject itself.
2 The state debate: beyond secularism vs religion
Historically,1 the newly formed Arab nationalist
governments co-opted and adapted religion for
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their own political ends. Secularism – a
separation between religion and state – thus did
not take root in Arab states. The portrayal of
Islam as a threat to secularism betrays the fact
that the relationship between the state, religion,
society and politics is far more intertwined, in the
Palestinian case, than is often portrayed. I concur
with Asad’s approach (2003) of not adapting an
analytical approach of dichotomised realities of
the secular vs the religious. A more nuanced
approach would be to examine the historical
circumstances around which secular political
projects or Islamist counterparts are promoted.
Arab nationalism, as adapted by Baathist,
Nasserist or other regime types, incorporated
Islam as part of its claims of difference vis-à-vis
other socialist ideologies; it was a unifying
ideology in the quest for building what Salame
(2001) calls, ‘a state of legitimation’ (a source of
legitimacy), deriving strength from enduring
social elements, rather than insisting more
fundamentally on change and innovation. Al-
Azem (2004) goes further and accuses ‘secular’
nationalist elites of obstructing a rational
understanding of Islamic cultural heritage so that
it instead became the subject of independent
social science research – an ideological tool in the
service of elite regional, national or party politics.
So when the nationalist waves faded away, the
uncritical approach to Islam and Islamic heritage
remained and was easily presented as an
untouchable core of Arab and Muslim identity.
In analysing the fluctuating relationship between
Islam as a religion and nationalism as a secular
notion, Lawrence (1987) explains that Islamism
was shaped by the overwhelming and new
character of ‘secularisation’. This not only
permeated the elite classes of Muslim countries
but permanently affected everyone living in the
Muslim world through the emergence of new
institutions of communications, healthcare,
education and above all nationalism itself, which
claimed to ‘construct’ new citizens. Lawrence
propounds the idea that, while nationalism was
not originally a Muslim institution, it was
adopted by Muslim elites as a strategy for coping
with the otherwise intractable authority of
colonial governments, economies and armies. In
this context, what emerged within nationalism in
nearly every country, including Egypt, was an
enforced obedience to the state, with the kind of
Islam advocated by the government made
compulsory as a symbol of political loyalty and
religious orthodoxy (Lawrence 1987: 29). Thus,
Islam was amalgamated with Arab secularism
from its inception.2
Turning to the Palestinian case, it is argued here
that the brand of Islamic movement contesting
the power of the Palestinian national movement
is a product of the failure of the secular national
movement to deliver on its promises of national
independence or state building. One of the
elements that eased the shift to a ‘fusion’
between Islam and Palestinian nationalism was
the defeat of the Palestinian national movement
and the ability of Hamas to identify itself with
the struggle to gain Palestinian national rights.
Analysing the ideology of the political party
Fateh, as the backbone of the PLO and
contemporary nationalist movement, Abdel-
Jawad (2003) states that Islam as a religion was
never put aside by Fateh leadership. In his study
of the subject, Abdel-Jawad reveals that the
majority (13 out of 21) of the founding leaders of
Fateh in the early 1950s were either members of
the Muslim Brothers, the Islamic Liberation
party, or sympathisers (Abdel-Jawad 2003).
Fateh’s first magazine, Falastinuna (Our
Palestine), reflected the religious language and
orientation of the nascent movement which,
according to Abdel-Jawad, helped spread the
movement’s agenda among refugees in Gaza who
came from rural, conservative backgrounds.
Among the old elite of Fateh, Christians
represented 20 per cent (although their presence
did not exceed 11 per cent) and all the founding
leaders were Muslims. As for the secular PLO,
Fateh always made extensive use of common
Islamic concepts such as jihad (holy war) and
shahid (martyr). The Marxist Palestinian
movements never had anything like the popular
appeal of Fateh. It is legitimate to point out here
that the PLO’s discourses on modernity were
conditioned not only by the encounter with
Zionism, but also by its troubled relations with
different Arab regimes – using a more
conservative and religious approach with the
Saudis for example, more liberal and ‘modern’
with the Tunisians, and ‘progressive’ and
‘modern’ with the then Soviet Union.
One of the diagnostic criteria for unmasking the
nature of a national project is to examine its
construction of gender and gender relations.
Many writers and scholars, however, who have
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written on Hamas and Palestinian nationalism
(Hroub 1996, 2000; Abul-Omrein 2000; Abu
’Amr 1994) are silent on this question.
Those authors who insist Palestinian national
identity was mainly based on secular idioms
homogenise this identity; they refuse to see how
nationalism and its multiple identities are
permeated by class, gender and religion (Anthias
and Yuval-Davis 1989; Kandiyoti 1991).
Kandiyoti, for example, demonstrates that
‘although many [nationalisms] were influenced
by the ideas of the enlightenment and were of
secular persuasion, they unwittingly endorsed
the notion that any changes in the position of
women could only be condoned in the national
interest’ (Kandiyoti 1991: 410). Nationalist
ideologies need an ‘ideal woman’ but she is
ambiguous. Fateh perceived gender relations and
the ‘ideal woman’ as carrying, as Kandiyoti puts
it, ‘their own ambiguities and tensions’
(Kandiyoti 1998: 282). The ‘ideal woman’ was
portrayed as the peasant, the fertile, modest and
‘authentic’. However, at the same time, ‘the
modern woman’ was portrayed as the disciplined,
with a de-eroticised body, the ‘sister of men’. In
other words, the Palestinian national movements
portrayed women as the ‘privileged repository of
uncontaminated national values’ (Kandiyoti
1991: 410). The parallel models of woman have
persisted through Fateh, the PLO and the
Palestinian National Authority (PA).
Fateh always resisted challenging the patriarchal
control of women within the PLO. The many
attempts by activists in the General Union of
Palestinian Women to promote and protect
women’s rights in divorce, marriage and
inheritance, failed. The activists attributed this
failure to the refusal of the head of the PLO to
endorse any such move or, according to Khaled
and Salah (personal interview, 2003), ‘to question
the flagrant abuse and exploitation of some of
the Fateh fighters whether in the uncontrolled
practices of polygamy, the failure to recognise
their children from undeclared marriages, or the
many cases of domestic violence’.
This might serve to explain the ease with which
support for a secular PLO, comprising of men
and women, was transformed into sympathy for,
and, in many cases, even allegiance to, the
Islamic movement. The increasing politicisation
of gender and religious identities might call into
question the ‘progressiveness’ of the secular
Palestinian national unity and the unity of the
Palestinian national identity.
3 The state instrumentalising religion,
demobilising political Islam
In the Arab world, the fusion of religion and
nationalism as a brand of ‘secularism’ wielded
among the post-colonial national elites was a
clear marker of identity for these post-colonial
nation-states. Writing on Islamism and
secularism, Hermassi (1993), for example,
summarises the differences in the important
distinction between de facto and de jure secularism.
Whereas in the West de jure secularism called for
the formal separation of the church and state,
the Arab state recognised Islam as the religion of
society, but de facto demobilised its political use.
Further conflict may be noted between Islam as a
religion and nationalism. In contemporary
political Islamic movements, the ‘new’ meaning
of Islam includes all Muslims but excludes non-
Muslims, unlike nationalism. But like
nationalism, Islam is also interpreted as a
political system and used for political ends,
which is a threat to secularism (Al-Azmeh 1996;
Roy 1999). However, according to Asad (2003),
both Arab nationalism and Islamism share a
concern with the modernising state because
Islamism takes for granted and seeks to work
through the nation-state, which is so central to
the predicament of all Muslims. It is this statist
project, he argues, and not the fusion of religious
and political ideas that gives Islamism a
‘nationalist’ cast. Asad urges us not to focus on
the ‘real motives’ of Islamists, but rather to look
for what circumstances oblige ‘Islamism’ to
emerge publicly as a political discourse, and how
it challenges the deep structures of secularism.
He stresses interconnections between religion
and secularism by stating: 
… although religion is regarded as alien to
the secular, the latter is also seen to have
generated religion, that in the pre-modern
past secular life created superstitious and
oppressive religion and in the modern present
secularism has produced enlightened and
tolerant religion. Thus, the insistence on a
sharp separation between the religious and
the secular goes with the paradoxical claim
that the latter continually produces the
former. (Asad 2003: 193)
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Examining the Palestinian case in the light of
the above insights, it can be said that the current
entrenchment presented as a conflict between
‘dark forces’ and ‘enlightened forces’ is not
merely a veneer for deep and divergent political
agendas. They diverge over what path should be
followed to realise an independent Palestinian
state, the path of national struggle advocated by
Hamas or peace negotiations as advocated by the
PA. This political diversion took a violent path
through the indoctrination process of the
Palestinian security forces as they cracked down
on Islamists to ‘protect the national project’.
This process perceives Islamists as aliens rather
than part of the Palestinian polity, thus allowing
serious violation of rights whether political, civic
or social.
The witch hunt against Islamists led them to use
force to protect their presence and take over power
in Gaza in June 2007. The same could happen in
the West Bank where all political, social, economic,
education, culture and media institutions (around
200 organisations and centres) have been looted
and shut down (Palestinian Information Centre
2007; Hamas 2010).
The use of violence by the PA, as has happened
in most Arab states dealing with their
oppositions, led and is still leading to the erosion
of the firm foundations needed to build a civil
state and establish democratic rule.
4 Feminists engaging with a state
instrumentalisation religion
Regarding the feminist stance, the
establishment of the PA in 1993 triggered a
process that led to the demobilisation of all
social movements, including the women’s
movement. The most remarkable change
occurred with the founding of women’s NGOs.
Before the formation of the PA, Palestinian
society was organised in and around political
parties and grassroots mass organisations. NGOs
were affiliated with these under the umbrella of
the PLO, which encouraged and financially
supported the parties and their satellite
organisations. While the PLO and its political
parties were banned by Israel, their satellite
organisations – because they were seen as service
providers – were to some extent allowed to
function. Women participants in these efforts
belonged to what were known as ‘grassroots’
organisations. These were the women’s
committees, the branches of political parties,
which became so well known for their role in
sustaining the first Palestinian intifada in
December 1987. Their success lay in organising
and mobilising the masses based on their skills in
building relations with people. They succeeded
because they had a cause to defend and a mission
to fulfil and because they believed strongly in the
political organisations with which they were
affiliated. It was important for them to be known
and trusted, to have easy access to people, to
care about them and help them when needed.
The task required daily, tiring, time-consuming
efforts in networking and organising. These
cadres knew their constituencies on a personal
level and communication depended on face-to-
face human contact.
By the end of the 1987 intifada, with the signing
of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, an early version
of the NGO sector was already operating as the
main channel for the foreign aid, which enabled
service delivery at the grassroots level. These
services included clinics, schools, kindergartens
and income-generating projects. These NGO
actors thus became important and acquired even
more power than their parent organisations.
When the Madrid Conference initiated the state-
building process in 1991, the role of NGOs in the
West Bank and Gaza changed. There was a
noticeable increase in feminist women’s
organisations from 1988 to 1994 (Jad 2000: 44)
propagating a new discourse on women and
women’s status, but within the context of a
steady decline in women’s mobilisation. An
unpublished study by the Palestinian NGO,
Panorama, focusing on five women’s mass
organisations, shows that membership of these
organisations declined by 37 per cent after 1993
and that new enrolment in 1996 did not exceed 3
per cent, with most of it occurring (probably due
to patronage) in the Fateh women’s organisation
(Jad 2000: 44).
The rise in the number and influence of NGOs,
on the other hand, which happened alongside the
state-building dynamic, cannot be
underestimated – if one is to understand the
trajectory of the women’s movement in
Palestine. In fact, the dual dynamics of state
building and ‘NGO-isation’ have led to the
increasing fragmentation and demobilisation of
all Palestinian social movements. The
composition of NGOs has contributed to these
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tendencies: restricted or closed membership;
decision-making lying in the hands of the
administrative body of the organisation; issues of
national concern are transformed into ‘projects
with limited life cycles; a total dependence on
foreign funding, for example. The constituency
of NGOs is not a natural social grouping, but
artificially constructed. It is receptive rather
than interactive and of interest only within the
period of a particular project. There is also a
cultural dimension, involving the dissemination
of values favouring dependency, a lack of self-
reliance and new modes of consumption.3 NGO-
isation (Jad 2004) as a process has thus
introduced changes in the composition of much
of the women’s movement, bringing to the fore a
middle-class, professional women’s elite at the
expense of the rural and refugee women activists
from grassroots organisations. Thus, the reliance
of women’s NGOs on globalised, rather than
local tools, automatically limits the range of
possible NGO influence on major issues related
to social change such as women’s equality and
gender justice: hence, their dependence of the
‘good will’ of the PA to reform the legislation
affecting gender relations or to introduce new
policies to ‘improve’ the situation for women.
The political split between the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip after Hamas took over power in
Gaza on 15 June 2007, left many women’s
feminist secular organisations in a precarious
place. Continuing claiming rights from the PA in
the West Bank will mean undermining the power
of the Legislative Council paralysed by the
political split and the arrest of most Islamist
members elected in 2006. It will also encourage
the Islamist Hamas government in Gaza to issue
its own legislation. Thus, the reliance on issuing
presidential decrees to introduce legal reform
advocated by women’s organisations (particularly
in the penal code, issued by presidential decree
in March 2010) will lead to limited reform that
will apply only in the West Bank and at the
expense of democratic institutions and
principles. It will also lead to the separation of
women’s rights from other rights – particularly
civil and political rights – violated at many levels
by the Palestinian ‘secular’ authority.
The discourse, therefore, used by some feminist
NGOs based on a liberal, individualistic notion of
rights, which ignores the plight of many social
and political groups and movements deprived by
the ‘secular’ national state from their basic civil
and political rights, will not help achieve
women’s rights (if attempted in separation from
other rights) and nor will it help bring about
tangible democratic transformation, let alone
national liberation.
In this context, the secularists, while
pressurising and challenging the Islamists, are
nonetheless losing ground by advocating the
discourse of rights in isolation from the national
agenda and in the absence of organised and
mobilised constituencies. Feminist NGO
activism, based on short-lived projects, does not
have the potential to offer an alternative. By
becoming an opposition movement against all
forms of violations of civic and human rights, the
Islamists have developed a political organisation.
In contrast, women in NGOs have no organised
constituency and the support they have, if they
get it, is derived from a decaying de-legitimised
Arab authority.
Amid the stagnant political scene and lack of
trust and recognition between secularists and
Islamists in the region, there is a way out of the
impasse that could forge common ground; the
civil state could possibly constitute this common
ground. The civil state takes as its basis the idea
of the public will vs the divine will, meaning that
its source of legitimacy and legislation is this
civil will. The civil state is governed by the rule
of law and is based on the concept of full
citizenship for all its citizens irrespective of race,
ethnicity, creed, gender or religion. All citizens
are guaranteed civil, political and social rights
(women’s rights included) by law, as long as
strong and well-organised women’s movements
advocate for their rights.
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Notes
1 Mostly in the 1950s or post-independence.
2 Efforts to apply the concept of the nation-
state to Islam and to the Islamic umma
(community of believers) are a salient feature
of the recent Muslim exploration of political
issues. Some authors have tried to combine
Islam with nationalism by treating Islam and
Arabism (uruba) as an inseparable entity. Al-
Bazzaz (a young Iraqi teacher), for example,
denied there was a contradiction between
Islam and Arab Nationalism. For him, Islam is
a national religion, the real Islam was Arab
Islam and the Arabic language is the ‘soul of
the Arab Nation’.
3 In advertisements in Palestinian newspapers,
it is common to read about collective
community actions organised by youth groups,
such as cleaning the streets, planting trees,
painting walls, etc., followed by a little icon
indicating the names of the donors who
funded these ‘projects’. And many NGO
activities are held in fancy hotels, serving
fancy food, distributing glossy material and
hiring ‘presentable’ youths to help organise
the event. This has led to the gradual
disappearance of the ‘old’ image of the casual
activist with the peasant look and accent.
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